Can an employee proceed on a disability discrimination claim solely based upon the employer's decision to reduce her discretionary bonus?  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered this issue in Davis v. New York City Department of Education.

 

In Davis, the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court's grant of summary judgment against a school teacher claimed her employer's decision to reduce her bonus after a 4-month absence constituted disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  As a teacher, the plaintiff's employment was governed by a union contract.  The school received a lump sum bonus award for student achievement and a school compensation committee established the criteria for determining individual bonus amounts, including making adjustments to bonus amounts for individuals who worked for less than a full academic year.

 

The plaintiff requested a leave of absence after being in a car accident.  The leave was granted, and she ended up being out a total of four months both to recover from her injuries and to serve on a grand jury.  When the time came to award individual bonuses, the employee was informed that she would receive $1,000 while the substitute that taught in her absence would receive $2,000.

 

The employee filed a charge of discrimination alleging that this decision constituted disability discrimination, and ultimately filed a pro se lawsuit alleging the same in federal district court.  The employer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the reduction of a discretionary bonus does not constitute an adverse employment action for disability discrimination purposes but instead resulted from her absence and the contributions that the substitute made while she was away.  The district court concluded that the reduction of a discretionary bonus alone is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action and dismissed the claim.

 

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed this holding.  In so doing, the Second Court concluded that circumstances may arise in which reduction of a discretionary bonus could constitute an adverse employment action, noting that an "adverse employment action" is created whenever an employer's action is "materially adverse" with respect to the terms and conditions of employment.  While the lower court concluded that the fact that the bonus was discretionary precluded its denial (or reduction) from being "materially adverse," the Second Circuit disagreed.  Instead, the court reasoned, an employer's decision to deny a discretionary bonus on the basis of discriminatory animus would be "materially adverse."

 

Despite the lower court's error in reasoning, the Second Circuit nonetheless affirmed its grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the employee failed to show that the employer had discriminatory motivation.  According to the court: "The employer explained, and it is uncontested, that [the employee] was absent for four months, that during her absence [she] did not contribute to the school's earning of bonuses for its teachers, that it needed to obtain a substitute teacher during [her] lengthy absence, and that the substitute teacher contributed importantly to the school's earning of the bonus."  As such, the court concluded, there was no discriminatory motive for the reduced bonus and summary judgment on the plaintiff's disability discrimination claim was proper.  Davis v. New York City Department of Education